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Abstract
Government behavior can be impacted by the benefits arising from natural resources. Benev-
olent government and political leaders may use them to improve the welfare of people, whereas
non-benevolent ones may use them for their own interest. As an attempt to examine the effects
of the oil bonanza on government behavior in a comprehensive manner, the current study inves-
tigates how giant oilfield discoveries affect the size and composition of government expenditure
using the data of 148 countries between 1972 and 2008. We find that giant oilfield discoveries
significantly increase total government expenditure in the medium and long term, although they
do not have an impact in the short term. We also obtain evidence that democracy plays a
mediating role in these effects; if the democracy level in a country is mature, the size of total
government spending does not increase even when discovering giant oilfields. Considering each
category of government expenditure, giant oilfield discoveries significantly increase expenditure
on defense and general public services, whereas they decrease expenditure on public order and
safety, and economic affairs. Furthermore, giant oilfield discoveries do not have a significant im-
pact on social spending including health, education, and social protection. Finally, giant oilfield
discoveries increase the net implicit gasoline subsidy in the long term. These findings enhance
our understanding of the effects of oil bonanza on government behavior.
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1 Introduction
There have been debates in the “resource curse” literature about whether natural resources are
a curse or a blessing for a country.1 Proponents of the resource curse hypothesis have indicated
that the endowment of natural resources can have negative consequences on the socio-economy and
politics of a country. One notable negative consequence, the widely known “Dutch disease,” is a
phenomenon that explains possible negative effects of resource abundance on an economy. Resource
revenue will induce currency appreciation, causing contraction of the manufacturing sector (Corden
and Neary, 1982). As a seminal study in this regard, Sachs and Warner (1995) show that natural
resource abundance lowers economic growth, and provide a supportive view of Dutch disease. Over-
estimating revenue from natural resources can lead to overconsumption for unproductive purposes
(Weil, 2013). This temptation for increasing consumption may cause persistent budget deficits, and
have an adverse effect on the economy of a country. In addition to its negative impacts on a coun-
try’s economy, natural resource abundance can also have toxic effects on politics or institutional
quality (e.g., Ross, 2001; Bulte et al., 2005).2 Lucrative revenues from natural resources can lead
to an increase in rent-seeking activity and corruption, or possibly armed conflicts, as experienced
by countries such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone. However, other research argues that resource abun-
dance does not necessarily lead to adverse consequences. Some recent studies such as Alexeev and
Conrad (2009) and Smith (2015), argue that natural resources have a positive impact on economic
development. These different streams of research in the literature indicate that the effects of natural
resource abundance are not straightforward. Given the differing views, research on socioeconomic
and political effects of resource abundance is important and worth being pursued.
Many studies have focused on examining the effects of natural resource endowments on economic
development and the quality of institutions. In an attempt to provide new evidence, the current
study provides an investigation on the impacts on government behavior (i.e., government expendi-
ture), which has not been sufficiently addressed by previous studies. In general, the government of
natural resource-rich countries depends heavily on revenues from natural resources. For example,
in Nigeria, oil has accounted for 70–85 percent of all government revenues and 90–95 percent of
all foreign exports since the 1970s (Amundsen, 2017). Because of this high dependency, natural
resources can undoubtedly play an important role in shaping government behavior. Motivated by
such a possibility, the current study comprehensively investigates how natural resources affect the
size and composition of government expenditure.
The current study differs from previous ones and contributes to the literature in several as-
pects. First, we investigate the detailed effects of natural resources on the size and composition
of government expenditure.3 One may note that these effects are not necessarily clear, depending
on a country’s socio-economic and political environment. If natural resource companies are com-
pletely state-owned, government revenues as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) are likely to
1van der Ploeg (2011), Frankel (2012), and Venables (2016) provide a detailed survey on the resource curse.
2Ross (2015) reviews toxic effects of natural resources on politics and insists that the windfall of revenues from
natural resources, specifically petroleum, negatively affects the quality of governance in a country.
3Shelton (2007) comprehensively investigates the determinants of government expenditure, although he does not
consider the role of natural resource.
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increase. Alternatively, if resource companies are completely private-owned, the natural resource
windfalls do not necessarily increase government revenues to a large degree. Government revenues
also depend on royalties and taxes imposed by the government. The impacts of natural resources
on the composition of government expenditure are also ambiguous. Some studies examine their
impacts on specific government expenditure, e.g., military expenditure (Cotet and Tsui, 2013; Ali
and Abdellatif, 2015), health expenditure (Gylfason, 2001), and educational expenditure (Cockx
and Francken, 2014, 2016). In an attempt to provide new evidence and a significant extension,
our study uncovers government fiscal behavior in a more comprehensive manner and focuses on
seven specific expenditures: defense, public order and safety, general public services, economic af-
fairs, health, education, and social protection. This type of detailed investigation can provide more
insights into the relationship between natural resources and government behavior. Various policy
implications may arise from the results of our study.
Second, the current study focuses on the effect of giant oilfield discoveries. Since giant oilfield
discoveries result in the variation of resource windfalls in an exogenous manner, as pointed out by
Lei and Michaels (2014), a focus on it allows us to avoid the possibility of biased estimation results
caused by endogeneity problems. As a proxy for resource dependence, previous studies have analyzed
natural resource exports, natural resource rents, and natural capital wealth. When examining the
impacts on government expenditure, using these measures can result in endogeneity problems such
as simultaneity and reverse causality. These issues should be addressed since it can cause biased
estimation results, and result in incorrect implications. Our identification approach addresses this
by using giant oilfield discoveries as a proxy for resource windfalls, which are exogenous shocks.
Third, the current study considers a mediation role of democracy on the impacts of natural
resource on the size and composition of government expenditure. Democratization generally ex-
tends franchise to poor citizens, and as a result, nurtures a redistribution policy (Meltzer and
Richard, 1981). Furthermore, the consolidation of democracy emphasizes the checks and balances
on government behavior. The government in a more democratic country generally gives itself less
decision-making power. We investigate how the democracy level of a country holds its government
accountable and maintains transparency for its people regarding expenditure. This examination
can provide important implications regarding the role of democracy.
Our study is closely related to previous studies on the relationship between natural resources
and overall government expenditure. Arezki et al. (2011) find that an increase in resource wind-
falls causes more government spending and its impact is larger in autocratic countries.4 Caselli
and Michaels (2013), using Brazilian municipalities’ data, show that resource windfalls increase
municipal revenues and spending on public goods and services, although household income does
not necessarily increase. Furthermore, previous studies examine the relationship between natural
resources and specific government expenditure such as military, education, and health. We note
that the results are not simply comparable because they use different proxies for natural resources
and different estimation methodologies. In previous literature, there has been discussion about the
effect of natural resource abundance on military expenditure.5 Cotet and Tsui (2013) show that
4Arezki et al. (2011) define government spending as government expenditures as a share of non-resource GDP.
5Another strand of literature looks at the relationship of the resource abundance and civil war. For instance,
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whereas oil discoveries do not necessarily increase the likelihood of political violence, they increase
military expenditure in non-democratic countries. Ali and Abdellatif (2015) investigate this rela-
tionship by using the data on the Middle East and North Africa countries and show that oil and
forest rents increase military expenditure, but coal and natural gas rents decrease it. However,
their study does not sufficiently address the causality issue; natural resource rents may not be an
exogenous variable of military expenditure. In addition, several studies focus on the political deter-
minants of military expenditure (Albalate et al., 2012; Nordhaus et al., 2012; To¨ngu¨r et al., 2015).
Some studies investigate the effects of natural resource abundance on government expenditure for
education and health. Gylfason (2001) shows that natural resource abundance has negative impacts
on educational inputs, outcomes, and participation. Cockx and Francken (2014, 2016) find evidence
that natural resource abundance significantly decreases public health spending and public education
expenditure. Finally, Bhattacharyya et al. (2017) find that resource discoveries do not have any
impact on revenue decentralization and they lead to expenditure centralization.
The current study also contributes to the literature on the relationship between political regime
and government expenditure. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) indicate that the political system does not
influence fiscal variables except revenue used for aid. Furthermore, Mulligan et al. (2004) show that
as democracy matures, military expenditure decreases but nonmilitary government consumption,
education spending, and social spending remain the same. Kotera and Okada (2017) investigate how
democratization affects the size and composition of government expenditure and present evidence
of how democratization increases military expenditure and decreases health expenditure, while not
having an impact on total government expenditure. Nelson (2007) shows that more expenditure on
education and health is assured in a democratic regime, however, this increase does not necessarily
guarantee better education and health outcomes without more institutional reforms in a democratic
trend. Profeta et al. (2013) show that democracy does not necessarily have significant impact on
tax revenue and tax composition when controlling for countries’ fixed effects.
Using the data of 148 countries between 1972 and 2008 for the estimation, the main findings
of our study are summarized as follows. While oilfield discoveries do not impact total government
expenditure in the short run, they significantly increase it in the medium to long run. In addition,
democracy has a mediating effect on this increasing impact. Specifically, if the democracy level in
a country is mature, the government size does not increase even when giant oilfields are discovered.
This finding may indicate that checks and balances in a democratic system are functioning as a
factor that constrains a government’s temptation to increase its expenditure. Considering each
category of government expenditure, giant oilfield discoveries significantly increase expenditure on
defense and general public services, whereas they decrease expenditure on public order and safety
and economic affairs. Furthermore, giant oilfield discoveries do not have a significant impact on
social spending including health, education, and social protection. Finally, giant oilfield discoveries
increase net implicit gasoline subsidy in the long term.
Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998) find that natural resource abundance significantly increases the duration and occurrence
probability of civil wars. Morelli and Rohner (2015) indicate that natural resource concentration plays a significant
role in contributing to the incidence of civil wars. Berman et al. (2017) use geographical data on mining extraction
in Africa and show that mining has a positive impact on conflict at the local level.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we explain estimation method-
ology and data. Section 3 presents the estimation results and the corresponding discussion. Section
4 presents our conclusion.
2 Estimation methodology and data
To examine the effects of giant oilfield discoveries on the size and composition of government ex-
penditure, an unbalanced panel dataset is created, using annual data of 148 countries between 1972
and 2008. Table A1 in the Appendix indicates the countries included in our sample. The estimation
equation is specified as follows.
ln (yit+j) = β1Dit + β2DYit + γ
′Xit + µi + λt + εit
where subscripts i and t represent a country and year, respectively. µ is a country-specific effect;
λ is a year-specific effect; and ε is an error term. To examine the effects of giant oil discoveries on
future expenditure, year counter j ∈ {0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10} is considered. In corresponding estimations,
y represents total government expenditure, various categories of government expenditure as shares
of GDP, and net implicit gasoline subsidy. D is a dummy variable for giant oilfield discoveries in a
given year. DY measures the number of years with giant oilfield discoveries from t − 10 to t − 1.
The definitions and sources of data on total government expenditure, each category of government
expenditure, and giant oilfield discoveries will be explained in more detail later. Vector X consists
of various variables including a constant term, a dummy variable reflecting the accrual basis of
accounting, and other necessary control variables. Following previous studies, the necessary control
variables include real GDP per capita, trade openness proxied by share of the sum of exports and
imports in GDP, total population, share of the population aged 0-14 in total population, and share
of population aged 65 and above in total population. Natural logarithm is taken for all control
variables except discovery, discovery-years, democracy, and a dummy for the accounting system.
Based on Wagner’s law (e.g., Easterly and Rebelo, 1993), the pattern of government expenditure
(i.e., its size and its composition) changes depending on levels of economic development. Trade
openness, as indicated by Rodrik (1998), can have a positive relationship with the government
size (i.e., the government expenditure). As for population, whereas a larger size may result in the
increase in people’s variety of preference of public services, it also leads to the decrease in per capita
investment cost on public goods due to non-rivalness characteristics of public goods (Alesina and
Wacziarg, 1998). Such contrasts result in the ambiguous effect of the population size on public
expenditure. Population structure can have impacts on public expenditure as well. A higher share
of both younger and older people in a total population can increase welfare-related expenditure such
as health, education, and social protection.
The current study uses an indicator for giant oilfield discoveries available in Lei and Michaels
(2014) as the proxy for natural resource endowment. They construct the indicator until 2003, based
on the data in Horn (2003, 2004). They define discovered oilfield as a giant oilfield when the stock
of the ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of the oilfield contains the equivalent of 500 million
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barrels of oil or more. The choice of natural resource indicator is diverse in the literature. For
instance, Sachs and Warner (1995) employ natural resource exports; Cotet and Tsui (2013) use oil
wealth per capita; Ali and Abdellatif (2015) and Okada and Samreth (2017) consider various natural
resource rents; Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) choose per capita rent from energy, minerals and
forestry. However, using these measures can create endogeneity issues because natural resources are
not randomly distributed among countries. Giant oilfield discoveries suggested by Lei and Michaels
(2014) can be a better indicator. They state that “in a panel of countries, controlling for country
and year fixed effects, the timing of giant oilfield discoveries is plausibly exogenous, at least in the
short-medium run,” because “prospecting for oil is highly uncertain, and the odds of finding a giant
oilfield are usually low, so countries have little control over the timing of such finds.”
The data for government expenditure are adopted from Kotera and Okada (2017). Following
Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2017), we combine two databases to generate a longer panel
dataset of government expenditure. One is the Historical Government Finance Statistics (GFS)
provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2005) and another is the Government Finance
Statistics, also taken from IMF (2013). The Historical GFS is generated from the Government
Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM)1986. Its sample period is from 1972 to 1989. The GFS is based
on GFSM 2001 and its available sample period is from 1990 onwards. Merging GFSM 1986 and
GFSM 2001 into one dataset needs some adjustment, as explained by Kotera and Okada (2017),
since the two databases apply different methodologies.6 The first adjustment is the unification of
the different classifications of the government expenditure categories in the Historical GFS and
GFS. Adopting the approach in Wickens (2002), categories in the Historical GFS are adjusted
to those in GFSM 2001. As a result, we have ten categories in our study, which include total
government expenditure and other main subcategories. These subcategories include expenditures
on defense, public order and safety, general public services, economic affairs, health, education,
and social protection. The second adjustment relates to the different accounting bases of GFSM
1986, which adopts cash basis, and GFSM 2001, which adopts accrual basis for developed countries.
Seiferling (2013) argues that merging these databases should not be problematic in practice. He also
suggests the inclusion of a dummy variable to capture any possible systematic heterogeneity when
combining such databases. Following this, a dummy for accounting with accrual basis is considered
in our study. Moreover, accrual basis is used when both accounting bases are reported at a given
year in the GFS. The third adjustment is to use consolidated central governments data for both
databases for consistency. The last adjustment is to convert the government expenditures in the
Historical GFS database into GDP shares, by using GDP data obtained from the World Economic
Outlook Databases provided by the IMF (1999).
Regarding the other data, Ross et al. (2017) construct data for net implicit gasoline subsidy,
as the difference between the local price and the benchmark price in constant 2015 US dollars per
liter. World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017) provide the data for real GDP per capita,
trade openness (i.e., share of the sum of exports and imports in GDP), total population, population
shares between the ages of 0 to 14, and 65 and over in the total population. The data for democracy
6More detailed explanation on the differences between GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001 is provided in Wickens (2002).
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level are available in Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2017). Specifically, its “polity2” measure is used.
The polity2 measure reflects the democracy level in countries within a range of −10 and 10; the
closer its value to −10 (10), the more dictatorial (democratic) the country is. Table A2 in the
Appendix provides the definition of the variables and explains the data sources. Table A3 reports
the descriptive statistics of the variables used for the estimation.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Results on total government expenditure
Table 1 presents estimation results of the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on total government
expenditure. In columns (1)–(6), we consider their impact on future government expenditure in the
periods t + 0, t + 2, ..., t + 10, respectively. Although the coefficients of oilfield discoveries are not
statistically significant in columns (1), (2), and (5), they are significant in columns (3), (4), and, (6).
Therefore, whereas total government expenditure does not change just after giant oilfield discoveries,
it increases in the medium and long run after the discoveries. Cumulative past discoveries, which
means the number of years with giant oilfield discoveries from t− 10 to t− 1, significantly increase
total government expenditure in columns (1)–(4). These results also suggest that total government
expenditure increases in the medium and long run after giant oilfield discoveries. These time-lag
effects seem to be natural since policy change for expenditure needs time to adjust regardless of
political regime.
[Table 1 here]
Taking into account countries’ political regime, generally, the government of a more democratic
country is bound to be more transparent to its citizens (i.e., taxpayers) with regard to tax collection
and expenditure. This duty might function as a constraint preventing discretionary behaviors taken
by the government regarding its expenditure. We confirm that giant oilfield discoveries increase to-
tal government expenditure in Table 1. In order to examine how the democracy level influences
these effects, we add two interaction terms between giant oilfield discoveries and democracy level in
Table 2. In column (3), the coefficients of oilfield discoveries, past discoveries, democracy, and their
interaction terms are significant. Based on the results in column (3), Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate the
partial effect of giant oilfield discoveries and past discoveries conditional on democracy level, respec-
tively. These figures illustrate that the increasing effects of giant oilfield discoveries on government
expenditure decrease as democracy level matures. When a country is fully democratic, that is, the
democracy score is 10, this increasing effect is almost null. These findings should not be surprising
because checks and balances are imposed on the government in a more democratic country, thereby
resulting in the null effects of giant oilfield discoveries on government expenditure.
[Table 2 here]
[Fig. 1 here]
[Fig. 2 here]
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3.2 Results on public goods and infrastructure
In this section, we present the estimation results of expenditures on defense, public order and safety,
general public services, and economic affairs. In Tables 3 through 6, we show the results without
interaction terms between giant oilfield discoveries and democracy level in Panel A, and with them
in Panel B, although estimation results of control variables in all tables are not reported. Table 3
illustrates the estimation results of government expenditure on defense. Results of Panel A indicate
that giant oilfield discoveries significantly increase military expenditure, which is consistent with
results of Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Ali and Abdellatif (2015), although their studies consider
different samples and natural resource variables. In column (4) in Panel B, all coefficients of oilfield
discoveries and their interaction with democracy are statistically significant. Like the results in
Table 2, the increasing effect on military expenditure is mitigated by democracy level. This may be
because law and order in more democratic countries are more established and military expenditure
may not be necessary. Furthermore, in less democratic countries, oilfield discoveries are likely to
increase the likelihood of wars and conflicts for grabbing the benefits from natural resources as
widely argued in the literature of resource curse as toxic effects of natural resource endowment.7
[Table 3 here]
The results of government expenditure on public order and safety are presented in Table 4.
The table indicates that giant oilfield discoveries decrease expenditure on public order and safety
in the medium and long run. This finding seems to be in line with that in Table 3. When public
order is established by strengthening the military sector, which benefits from receiving more budget
allocation after giant oilfield discoveries as shown in Table 3, direct expenditure on public order and
safety may be reduced.
[Table 4 here]
Table 5 presents the results of government expenditure on general public services. The table
shows that this expenditure increases in the medium and long term after the discovery of giant
oilfields. These results seem to be natural. Among others, foreign aid and research and development
(R&D) in scientific knowledge are included in this expenditure. Prominent oil-producing countries
are often major powers in regions such as the Middle East and Africa. Natural resource windfalls
can act as diplomatic tools to increase the country’s presence in the international community.
They can provide foreign aid to increase the influence of their own country. For example, Saudi
Arabia has provided foreign aid to not only pursue the development goals of developing countries,
but also to promote Wahhabi expansion and development (Li, 2019). Furthermore, in a country
where the expectation of finding new oilfields is high due to previous discoveries, its government
may have a higher incentive to allocate more resources for R&D. Because technology advancement
is undoubtedly an important factor for increasing the probability of discovering new oilfields, the
7War and conflicts can affect military expenditure. We include an additional control variable for war, which is equal
to one if there are at least 1000 battle-related deaths and zero otherwise. This dummy variable is constructed using
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 17.1, which is provided by Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Allansson
et al. (2017). The results are similar even if including this variable, confirming the robustness of results.
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purpose for increasing expenditure for R&D would be to enhance scientific knowledge and technology
level. In addition, an oil-producing country may have a strong incentive to invest in improved
scientific knowledge and technology to increase the value added of oils through improved capacity
of petroleum refineries.
[Table 5 here]
We indicate the results of government expenditure on economic affairs in Table 6, which shows
slightly weak evidence that giant oilfield discoveries decrease this expenditure in the long term. This
category means public investment in traditional infrastructure such as manufacturing, construction,
and transport. Oil-rich countries are unlikely to have lower incentive to promote industrial develop-
ment, partly because they are already receiving significant revenues from natural resource windfalls.
The benefits from natural resources may also lead to the appreciation of currency in these coun-
tries. This can weaken the competitiveness of their exporting manufacturing sector, and lower the
incentive to invest more resources in this sector from both the public and private sector. Therefore,
giant oilfield discoveries decrease government expenditure on economic affairs. This phenomenon is
in line with the widely known Dutch disease covered in the literature.
[Table 6 here]
3.3 Results on social spending
We classify expenditure on health, education, and social protection as social spending, and report
the results in Tables 7, 8, and 9, respectively. Panel A in each table indicates that giant oilfield
discoveries do not have a direct impact on these expenditures. Although this finding seems to
be somewhat inconsistent with Cockx and Francken (2014, 2016), who find that natural resource
abundance decreases government expenditure on health and education, it should not be surprising.
This may be because while they use the share of natural capital in total national wealth and natural
capital per capita as indicators for natural resource endowment, our study employs giant oilfield
discoveries for that. The use of this indicator can allow us to avoid the possibility of endogeneity
problems as explained earlier. In column (4) of Panel B in Table 7, the interaction term between
discovery-years and democracy is statistically significant. Furthermore, the null hypothesis that
the coefficient of discovery-years and its interaction term with democracy are jointly zero, are
rejected at the conventional level. When the democracy level is less than −2.103, giant oilfield
discoveries increase health expenditure, and when it is more than this threshold value, they decrease
health expenditure. Our finding is in line with that in Cockx and Francken (2014, 2016) in more
democratic countries. A possible explanation for this result is that health expenditure in more
democratic countries is already substantial due to redistribution policy, whereas the government
in less democratic countries increases this expenditure when there is an increase in their revenues
from natural resources in order to appease the public. The results on health expenditure in Table
7 are similar to those on educational expenditure in Table 8. Finally, in the majority of cases,
giant oilfield discoveries do not have a significant impact on expenditure on social protection. These
results on health and social protection expenditure may also reflect the fact that these expenditures
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are already higher in democratic countries, due to the redistribution policy.
[Table 7 here]
[Table 8 here]
[Table 9 here]
3.4 Results on gasoline subsidy
In this section, we show the effects of giant oilfield discoveries on the net implicit gasoline subsidy in
Table 10. From Panel A in Table 10, the government increases the gasoline subsidy in the medium
and long run after discovering giant oilfield. The finding is natural. The government in many
oil-rich countries subsidizes gasoline prices partly because it gains the approval of the public. These
countries tend to be less democratic and so their government should avoid frustrating the public,
revolution, or even coup d’etat. For that purpose, the leaders in these countries have to appease
the public. In reality, the gasoline subsidy in Venezuela, Libya, and Saudi Arabia is extremely high.
The political system in these countries is dictatorial and political leaders should take measures to
control political upheaval.
[Table 10 here]
4 Concluding remarks
Whether natural resources are good for socio-economic development has been discussed extensively
for many years. In this study, in an attempt to provide new evidence, we examine how giant oilfield
discoveries affect the size and composition of government expenditure. We find that they signifi-
cantly increase the total government expenditure in the medium and long run. As the democracy
level in a country becomes consolidated, the impact becomes smaller. This is likely because the
checks and balances mechanism in more democratic countries function as a constraint, preventing
their governments from increasing discretionary expenditure. We also consider the impact on each
category of government expenditure and the gasoline subsidy. Giant oilfield discoveries increase ex-
penditure on defense and general public services and net implicit gasoline subsidy. On the contrary,
they do not have an impact on social spending such as health, education, and social protection.
Finally, giant oilfield discoveries increase net implicit gasoline subsidy in the long term.
This study provides policy implications regarding government behavior. The government can
obtain incremental revenue from natural resources. Benevolent government and political leaders
use it to improve the welfare of the people. However, the government and political leaders pursing
their own interests can dissipate and appropriate it, although they may partly employ it to appease
the people. Checks and balances are important to monitor the government and political leaders,
particularly in less democratic countries. Finally, it is noteworthy that although the current study
focuses on government expenditure, it does not necessarily provide any findings on policy outcomes.
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) find that government expenditure on education and health does not
necessarily improve child mortality and educational attainment in case of severe corruption and low
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bureaucratic quality. The investigation on the impacts of natural resources on such policy outcomes
can be an important further research dimension.
Appendix
See Tables A1–A3.
[Table A1 here]
[Table A2 here]
[Table A3 here]
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Fig. 1: Marginal effect of discovery
Notes: This figure illustrates the results of column (3) in Table 2. Dashed lines indicate 95%
confidence interval.
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Fig. 2: Marginal effect of discovery-years
Notes: This figure illustrates the results of column (3) in Table 2. Dashed lines indicate 95%
confidence interval.
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Table 1: Effects of oil discoveries on total government expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 years 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years
ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead
Discovery 0.004 0.023 0.030* 0.044* 0.035 0.045*
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027)
Discovery-years 0.033** 0.032** 0.027** 0.023* 0.016 0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008)
Democracy -0.007* -0.000 0.002 0.004 0.005* 0.007**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP per capita -0.079 -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.031 -0.047
(0.075) (0.059) (0.051) (0.047) (0.048) (0.052)
Trade openness 0.104* 0.080 0.085 0.074 0.070 0.039
(0.061) (0.058) (0.052) (0.048) (0.047) (0.044)
Population -0.347** -0.218* -0.161 -0.121 -0.108 -0.109
(0.135) (0.123) (0.118) (0.117) (0.116) (0.111)
Fraction 14- 0.256 0.279 0.133 0.058 0.033 0.025
(0.206) (0.183) (0.173) (0.183) (0.200) (0.223)
Fraction 65+ 0.263 0.230 0.131 0.073 0.074 0.090
(0.195) (0.177) (0.177) (0.188) (0.213) (0.237)
Countries 107 111 110 110 109 110
Observations 1994 2105 2200 2226 2168 2106
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total government expenditure as a
share of GDP. Discovery is a dummy variable for giant oilfield discoveries. Discovery-years is years
with giant oilfield discoveries during the last decade. GDP per capita, trade openness, and three
demographic variables are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include country fixed effects,
year dummies, a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, and a constant term, although we do
not report the results here. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country
level.
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Table 2: Interaction effects of oil discoveries and democracy on total government expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 years 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years
ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead
Discovery 0.007 0.041 0.046** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.072***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.026)
Discovery-years 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.022** 0.009
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
Democracy -0.005 0.002 0.004 0.005* 0.006** 0.007***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Discovery × Democracy -0.001 -0.004 -0.004* -0.004* -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Discovery-years × Democracy -0.003* -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP per capita -0.095 -0.024 -0.028 -0.026 -0.038 -0.046
(0.063) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) (0.051) (0.054)
Trade openness 0.094* 0.068 0.070 0.056 0.053 0.030
(0.055) (0.051) (0.045) (0.043) (0.047) (0.047)
Population -0.282** -0.147 -0.100 -0.072 -0.077 -0.094
(0.125) (0.116) (0.111) (0.109) (0.109) (0.107)
Fraction 14- 0.224 0.245 0.103 0.041 0.036 0.036
(0.202) (0.177) (0.165) (0.176) (0.198) (0.222)
Fraction 65+ 0.268 0.227 0.126 0.068 0.069 0.084
(0.195) (0.174) (0.169) (0.178) (0.204) (0.229)
Countries 107 111 110 110 109 110
Observations 1994 2105 2200 2226 2168 2106
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total government expenditure as a
share of GDP. Discovery is a dummy variable for giant oilfield discoveries. Discovery-years is years
with giant oilfield discoveries during the last decade. GDP per capita, trade openness, and three
demographic variables are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include country fixed effects,
year dummies, a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, and a constant term, although we do
not report the results here. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country
level.
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Table 3: Effects of oilfield discoveries on government expenditure on defense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 years 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years
ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead
Panel A: Without interaction terms
Discovery 0.028 0.014 0.056** 0.084* 0.069* 0.093**
(0.044) (0.034) (0.028) (0.044) (0.041) (0.042)
Discovery-years 0.046* 0.051** 0.045* 0.034 0.018 -0.002
(0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015)
Democracy -0.015** -0.011** -0.009* -0.006 -0.003 -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Panel B: With interaction terms
Discovery 0.026 0.019 0.064* 0.118** 0.088* 0.123***
(0.058) (0.056) (0.038) (0.049) (0.048) (0.045)
Discovery-years 0.072** 0.071*** 0.062** 0.046** 0.026 0.001
(0.034) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
Democracy -0.011* -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Discovery × Democracy 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009** -0.006 -0.011*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Discovery-years × Democracy -0.006** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.004** -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Countries 96 99 98 98 95 94
Observations 1526 1603 1663 1672 1629 1583
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of government expenditure on defense as
a share of GDP. Panels A and B include the same control variables as those in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively. See the notes to Tables 1 and 2 for additional details. The asterisks ***, **, and
* indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are
robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 4: Effects of oilfield discoveries on government expenditure on public order and safety
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 years 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years
ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead
Panel A: Without interaction terms
Discovery 0.028 -0.008 -0.002 -0.036 -0.095 -0.093**
(0.046) (0.035) (0.039) (0.040) (0.060) (0.045)
Discovery-years -0.041 -0.056** -0.050* -0.048** -0.030** -0.011
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011)
Democracy -0.008 0.016* 0.008 0.006 0.004 -0.000
(0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Panel B: With interaction terms
Discovery 0.043 -0.014 0.013 -0.045 -0.080 -0.063
(0.063) (0.076) (0.077) (0.049) (0.098) (0.043)
Discovery-years -0.034 -0.034 -0.037 -0.053 -0.029 -0.009
(0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.034) (0.021) (0.014)
Democracy -0.007 0.018** 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.000
(0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Discovery × Democracy -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)
Discovery-years × Democracy -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Countries 84 88 88 89 87 86
Observations 918 1003 1075 1096 1065 1033
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of government expenditure on public order
and safety as a share of GDP. Panels A and B include the same control variables as those in Tables
1 and 2, respectively. See the notes to Tables 1 and 2 for additional details. The asterisks ***, **,
and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses
are robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 5: Effects of oilfield discoveries on government expenditure on general public services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 years 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years
ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead
Panel A: Without interaction terms
Discovery -0.050 0.002 0.038 0.099** 0.164*** 0.136**
(0.056) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.061)
Discovery-years 0.078*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.073*** 0.047** 0.022
(0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.019)
Democracy -0.020** -0.004 0.003 0.007 0.011* 0.014*
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Panel B: With interaction terms
Discovery -0.106** -0.013 0.047 0.123** 0.206*** 0.184***
(0.052) (0.044) (0.055) (0.049) (0.046) (0.065)
Discovery-years 0.089*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.088*** 0.057** 0.029
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.023) (0.019)
Democracy -0.019** -0.002 0.005 0.010* 0.013* 0.015*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Discovery × Democracy 0.014*** 0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.014** -0.017**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Discovery-years × Democracy -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005* -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Countries 98 100 99 99 96 95
Observations 1575 1650 1710 1718 1672 1622
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of government expenditure on general public
services as a share of GDP. Panels A and B include the same control variables as those in Tables
1 and 2, respectively. See the notes to Tables 1 and 2 for additional details. The asterisks ***, **,
and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses
are robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 6: Effects of oilfield discoveries on government expenditure on economic affairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 years 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years
ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead
Panel A: Without interaction terms
Discovery 0.043 0.067 0.055 0.008 -0.010 -0.011
(0.031) (0.044) (0.052) (0.040) (0.028) (0.032)
Discovery-years 0.027 0.000 -0.017 -0.023* -0.025* -0.026*
(0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Democracy -0.012* -0.004 0.000 0.006 0.010 0.015***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Panel B: With interaction terms
Discovery 0.044 0.079 0.053 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005
(0.030) (0.055) (0.065) (0.047) (0.032) (0.032)
Discovery-years 0.033* 0.005 -0.014 -0.018 -0.020 -0.021
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Democracy -0.012 -0.003 0.001 0.007 0.011* 0.016***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Discovery × Democracy -0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Discovery-years × Democracy -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Countries 97 99 98 98 95 94
Observations 1538 1611 1667 1675 1629 1579
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of government expenditure on economic
affairs as a share of GDP. Panels A and B include the same control variables as those in Tables 1
and 2, respectively. See the notes to Tables 1 and 2 for additional details. The asterisks ***, **,
and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses
are robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 7: Effects of oilfield discoveries on government expenditure on health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 years 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years
ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead
Panel A: Without interaction terms
Discovery -0.018 -0.004 -0.027 0.047 -0.003 -0.023
(0.044) (0.045) (0.041) (0.055) (0.055) (0.039)
Discovery-years -0.014 -0.018 -0.017 -0.024 -0.023 -0.020
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Democracy 0.006 0.018* 0.022** 0.024* 0.025* 0.027**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Panel B: With interaction terms
Discovery 0.004 0.022 -0.005 0.059 0.008 0.000
(0.049) (0.046) (0.039) (0.056) (0.054) (0.040)
Discovery-years 0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Democracy 0.008 0.020** 0.025** 0.026** 0.026* 0.029**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Discovery × Democracy -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Discovery-years × Democracy -0.004* -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004* -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Countries 98 100 99 99 96 95
Observations 1586 1663 1723 1732 1686 1636
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of government expenditure on health as
a share of GDP. Panels A and B include the same control variables as those in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively. See the notes to Tables 1 and 2 for additional details. The asterisks ***, **, and
* indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are
robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 8: Effects of oilfield discoveries on government expenditure on education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 years 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years
ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead
Panel A: Without interaction terms
Discovery -0.015 -0.043 -0.017 -0.070 -0.117* -0.076
(0.027) (0.040) (0.046) (0.051) (0.063) (0.059)
Discovery-years -0.044 -0.049 -0.050 -0.049 -0.028 -0.010
(0.026) (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033)
Democracy 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Panel B: With interaction terms
Discovery -0.025 -0.025 0.006 -0.045 -0.097** -0.051
(0.036) (0.038) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Discovery-years -0.029 -0.028 -0.029 -0.028 -0.006 0.010
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019)
Democracy 0.002 0.007* 0.007 0.008* 0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Discovery × Democracy 0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Discovery-years × Democracy -0.004** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Countries 98 100 99 99 96 95
Observations 1596 1673 1733 1742 1696 1646
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of government expenditure on education
as a share of GDP. Panels A and B include the same control variables as those in Tables 1 and
2, respectively. See the notes to Tables 1 and 2 for additional details. The asterisks ***, **, and
* indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are
robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 9: Effects of oilfield discoveries on government expenditure on social protection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 years 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years
ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead
Panel A: Without interaction terms
Discovery -0.067 -0.038 -0.005 0.008 -0.011 0.033
(0.049) (0.028) (0.030) (0.036) (0.057) (0.049)
Discovery-years -0.007 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.020 0.018
(0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.016)
Democracy -0.002 0.006 0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Panel B: With interaction terms
Discovery -0.092 -0.030 -0.013 0.024 -0.007 0.016
(0.094) (0.040) (0.036) (0.045) (0.077) (0.065)
Discovery-years -0.021 -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.000 -0.005
(0.025) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.016)
Democracy -0.003 0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.010*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Discovery × Democracy 0.006 -0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.000 0.005
(0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Discovery-years × Democracy 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005* 0.005***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Countries 97 99 98 97 95 93
Observations 1526 1598 1653 1660 1615 1566
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of government expenditure on social pro-
tection as a share of GDP. Panels A and B include the same control variables as those in Tables 1
and 2, respectively. See the notes to Tables 1 and 2 for additional details. The asterisks ***, **,
and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses
are robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 10: Effects of oilfield discoveries on net implicit gasoline subsidy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 years 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 10 years
ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead ahead
Panel A: Without interaction terms
Discovery 0.152 -0.006 -0.073** 0.041* 0.053** 0.073**
(0.133) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029)
Discovery-years 0.100*** -0.005 -0.009 0.041* 0.064** 0.040*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
Democracy -0.002 0.001 -0.009* -0.002 0.000 0.004
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Panel B: With interaction terms
Discovery 0.116 -0.003 -0.086*** 0.045** 0.051* 0.077**
(0.117) (0.028) (0.027) (0.021) (0.029) (0.030)
Discovery-years 0.117*** 0.006 -0.029 0.038 0.068*** 0.040*
(0.023) (0.033) (0.034) (0.027) (0.026) (0.022)
Democracy 0.003 0.001 -0.009** -0.003 0.001 0.004
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Discovery × Democracy -0.027 -0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.020) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Discovery-years × Democracy -0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Countries 125 133 137 141 140 139
Observations 125 389 658 792 785 768
Notes: The dependent variable is net implicit gasoline subsidy in constant 2015 US dollars per liter.
Panels A and B include the same control variables as those in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. See the
notes to Tables 1 and 2 for additional details. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%,
and 10% significance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors
clustered at the country level.
26
Table A1: List of countries
Albania Denmark Lao PDR Qatar
Algeria Dominican Republic Latvia Romania
Angola Ecuador Lesotho Russian Federation
Argentina Egypt, Arab Rep. Liberia Rwanda
Armenia El Salvador Libya Saudi Arabia
Australia Equatorial Guinea Lithuania Senegal
Austria Estonia Luxembourg Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan Finland Macedonia, FYR Singapore
Bahrain France Madagascar Slovak Republic
Bangladesh Gabon Malawi Slovenia
Belarus Gambia, The Malaysia South Africa
Belgium Georgia Mali Spain
Benin Germany Mauritania Sri Lanka
Bhutan Ghana Mauritius Sudan
Bolivia Greece Mexico Suriname
Botswana Guatemala Moldova Swaziland
Brazil Guinea Mongolia Sweden
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Morocco Switzerland
Burkina Faso Guyana Mozambique Tajikistan
Burundi Haiti Myanmar Tanzania
Cabo Verde Honduras Namibia Thailand
Cambodia Hungary Nepal Togo
Cameroon India Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago
Canada Indonesia New Zealand Tunisia
Central African Republic Iran, Islamic Rep. Nicaragua Turkey
Chad Iraq Niger Uganda
Chile Ireland Nigeria Ukraine
China Israel Norway United Arab Emirates
Colombia Italy Oman United Kingdom
Comoros Jamaica Pakistan United States
Congo, Dem. Rep. Japan Panama Uruguay
Congo, Rep. Jordan Papua New Guinea Uzbekistan
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Paraguay Venezuela, RB
Cote d’Ivoire Kenya Peru Vietnam
Croatia Korea, Rep. Philippines Yemen, Rep.
Cyprus Kuwait Poland Zambia
Czech Republic Kyrgyz Republic Portugal Zimbabwe
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Table A2: Data definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
Total Total government expenditure as a share of GDP IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Defense Expenditure on defense as a share of GDP. Defense
includes military defense, civil defense, and so on
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Public order and safety Expenditure on public order and safety as a share of
GDP. Public order and safety include police services,
fire protection services, law courts, prisons, and so on
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
General public services Expenditure on general public services as a share of
GDP. General public services include executive and
legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external
affairs, foreign economic aid, and so on
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Economic affairs Expenditure on economic affairs as a share of GDP.
Economic affairs include general economic, commer-
cial, and labor affairs; affairs pertaining to agricul-
ture, forestry, fishing, hunting, fuel and energy, min-
ing, manufacturing, construction, transport, and com-
munication, and so on
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Health Expenditure on health as a share of GDP. Health in-
cludes medical products, appliances and equipment,
outpatient services, hospital services, public health
services, and so on
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Education Expenditure on education as a share of GDP. Educa-
tion includes pre-primary, primary, secondary, post-
secondary, nontertiary, and tertiary education, and so
on
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Social protection Expenditure on social protection as a share of GDP.
Social protection includes protection against sickness
and disability, old age, unemployment, and protection
for survivors, family and children, housing, and so on
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Net implicit gasoline
subsidy
The difference between the local price and the bench-
mark price in constant 2015 US dollars per liter
Ross et al. (2017)
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Table A2: Data definitions and sources (continued)
Variable Description Source
Discovery Dummy variable for the discovery of at least one giant
oilfield in a given year
Lei and Michaels (2013)
Discovery-years The number of years with giant oilfield discovery be-
tween t− 1 and t− 10
Lei and Michaels (2013)
Democracy The measure of democracy level reflecting the compet-
itiveness of political participation, the openness and
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the con-
straints on the chief executive
Marshall et al. (2017)
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita in constant 2005 U.S. dollars World Bank (2017)
Trade openness The sum of exports and imports divided by GDP World Bank (2017)
Population Total population World Bank (2017)
Fraction 14- Fraction of population between the ages 0 and 14 as a
share of the total population
World Bank (2017)
Fraction 65+ Fraction of population aged 65 and above as a share
of the total population
World Bank (2017)
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Total 2562 3.273 0.421 1.238 5.056
Defense 1928 0.634 0.784 -1.966 4.673
Public order and safety 1211 0.060 0.784 -2.526 1.975
General public services 1998 1.810 0.596 -0.942 4.137
Economic affairs 1958 1.333 0.629 -1.050 3.387
Health 2015 0.431 1.014 -4.227 2.294
Education 2025 0.925 0.791 -1.897 2.528
Social protection 1942 1.374 1.389 -4.497 3.257
Net implicit gasoline subsidy 810 -0.470 0.485 -2.053 0.797
Discovery 5902 0.058 0.234 0 1
Discovery-years 6642 0.558 1.367 0 10
Democracy 6290 0.704 7.507 -10 10
GDP per capita 5827 8.012 1.546 4.752 11.641
Trade openness 5729 4.041 0.680 -3.863 6.276
Population 7249 15.807 1.591 10.766 21.004
Fraction 14- 7252 3.529 0.328 2.584 3.949
Fraction 65+ 7252 1.607 0.615 -0.267 3.056
Notes: These statistics are calculated based on 148 countries over the period 1972–2008. All
variables except discovery, discovery-years, and democracy are in the natural logarithm.
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